the dispositional thesis implies the relativity of [colours] ; for the question arises, to which perceiver or perceivers the red object is disposed to look red…Thus suppose that a given range of objects looks systematically red to us and systematically green to Martians, and suppose our and their colour discriminations are equally fine. Then there will be no choosing between these groups of perceivers in respect of whose experience determines the colour of the objects in question…This relativity implies that there is no genuine disagreement between us and the Martians when they call an object green which we call red; for all these colour ascriptions assert is that the object looks green to them and red to us. It is thus entirely proper to speak of objects as red with respect to perceiver x and green with respect to perceiver y…There is thus a sense in which an object has (or could have) many contrary colours simultaneously. 4 If Brit and Mitt can be treated like the Martians, the chip is both "unique green with respect to Brit" and "yellowish-green with respect to Mitt"; Brit sees the chip as having the former color, and Mitt the latter, and the chip has both colors.
What is it to be "unique green with respect to Brit" or, more generally, to be "color c with respect to perceiver x"? The quotation from McGinn apparently gives an answer: to be color c with respect to perceiver x is to be (disposed to) look c to x. But now there is a problem. Return to the example of poisonousness-in fact, an example used by McGinn (10) to illustrate the relationalist thesis. Certainly, some things are "poisonous with respect to x" but not "poisonous with respect to y": for example, this strawberry bush is poisonous with respect to Brandy (a human) and not poisonous with respect to Bambi (a deer). What is to be "poisonous with respect to x"? Suppose someone gave this answer:
( 1) o is poisonous with respect to x iff o is disposed to look poisonous to x
The problem is not that (1) is implausible, but that it is not even false. Relationalism about 'poisonous' means that there is no such thing as the property of being poisonous simpliciter: to be "poisonous" is always to be poisonous with respect to so-and-so. Thus 'poisonous' on the right hand side needs to be interpreted appropriately, and there are indefinitely many ways of doing that. Before that is done, the question of (1)'s truth or falsity does not arise.
Suppose, then, 'poisonous' on the right hand side is replaced with an expression of the form 'poisonous with respect to so-and-so'. Even if the resulting thesis is true, it clearly offers no explanation of what it is to be "poisonous with respect to x", since the relational locution is being used on both sides of the biconditional.
Recapitulating these points in the case of color, McGinn's first attempt at explaining what it is to be "color c with respect to x" is:
(2) o has color c with respect to x iff o is disposed to look c to x
By the relationalist's lights (2) is not even false, because there is no such thing as the property of having color c simpliciter. Thus 'c' on the right hand side needs to be interpreted appropriately, and there are indefinitely many ways of doing that. 5 Hence (2) needs to be replaced with this:
(3) o has color c with respect to x iff o is disposed to look c-with-respect-to-y to x (The hyphenation emphasizes that the whole phrase, 'c with respect to y' specifies the way o is disposed to look.) And again, even if (3) is true, it clearly offers no explanation of what it is to have "color c with respect to x", as the relational locution is being used on both sides of the biconditional.
In the case of 'poisonous with respect to x', there is no great mystery. The strawberry bush is poisonous with respect to Brandy-or, more colloquially, poisonous to 
Relativism
Relationalism multiplies perceptible properties. In particular, there are many "unique greens": unique green for Brit in C, unique green for Mitt in C*, and so on. Apart from the vexing issue of how to understand the locution 'color c for S in C', the unique-green properties are straightforward relational properties. 8 Relativism, on the other hand, trades a multiplicity of properties for a multiplicity of parameter-values relative to which an object is unique green. According to the relativist there is just one property, unique green, but objects do not have this property simpliciter: one and the same object may be unique green, relative to Brit and C, and yet not unique green, relative to Mitt and C*. And if 6 Apart from McGinn, other notable defenses of relationalism are Jackson and Pargetter 1987 and McLaughlin 2000 , 2003 Being married is a relational property, but there is such a thing as being married simpliciter, and so (on our usage) relationalism about marital status is false. Cohen's usage is different: color relationalism, as he defines it, is the view that colors are "constituted in terms of relations to subjects" (2009: 7); that is, are relational properties with "subjects" as one of the relata. Cohen thus counts dispositionalism (i.e. McGinn's "Lockean assumption" in section 1.1) as a version of relationalism. However, Cohen himself holds the stronger thesis, "the relativity of [colours]" in McGinn's phrase-that is, relationalism in our sense.
objects do not have this property simpliciter, the proposition that an object has it is not true simpliciter: it is true relative to Brit and C, false relative to Mitt and C*.
This idea has been developed by Egan (2006a Egan ( , 2006b Egan ( , 2012 , and is defended by Brogaard (2009 Brogaard ( , 2010 Brogaard ( , 2012 . 9 (Egan himself is uncommitted.) Although there might be some respects in which relativism is more attractive than relationalism (Egan 2012: 311) , the relativist apparatus is quite controversial. Egan, for example, takes Lewis (1979a) 2009.) As we are in sympathy with these criticisms, and as the main problems for relationalism arise equally (sometimes in a different guise) for relativism, we will mostly concentrate on relationalism.
2: The argument from perceptual variation, and the naïve view
The plausibility of relationalism and relativism depends entirely on an argument that we briefly described at the start of this paper, the "argument from perceptual variation".
Since these views are unmotivated if the argument fails, it is crucial to examine it carefully. 10 Let us set out the argument from perceptual variation using the example of Brit and Mitt. Brit and Mitt both have normal color vision, as measured by standard tests.
They are looking at a chip in ordinary lighting conditions. Although the focus is on perception, not language, for vividness we may suppose that Brit says 'The chip is unique 9 Brogaard uses 'perspectivalism' for what we are calling 'relativism ' (2010: 256 10 Cohen (2009: 26-36) gives versions of the argument for three types of cases: cross-species variation, interpersonal variation, and intrapersonal variation. We think the cross-species cases raise quite different issues and will not discuss them here (see Byrne and Hilbert 2003a: 15-6 The first point to make about this passage is that Brogaard has seriously exaggerated the extent of "radical epistemicism", at least insofar as it is motivated by empirical facts about variation in color vision. It does not entail that all answers to questions of the form 14 The worst-case scenario may just be collective unknowability: Brit can know that the chip is unique green, but we can't. The issues here overlap with the literature on "disagreement" (see, e.g., Lackey and Christensen 2013 Is there a specific worry about the meaning of (mildly esoteric) terms like 'unique yellow'? Suppose one is taught the meaning of 'unique yellow' by being shown samples of objects (lemons, say) that are presumed to be unique yellow. Further suppose that this procedure in effect indicates to the student that 'unique yellow' refers to the apparent color of the samples. (Brogaard seems to have something like this in mind when she says that it's plausible that the meaning of color terms is known by "introspection".) Then widespread variation in color perception will lead to widespread variation in the interpretation of 'unique yellow'. That is the first horn of the dilemma Brogaard poses at the end of the quotation. The second horn appears to be the rejection of the ostensive model of the acquisition of terms like 'unique yellow'. Whatever the merits of the ostensive model for terms like 'red' and 'yellow', it clearly fails for 'unique yellow'.
'Unique yellow' is not introduced by ostension, but rather by defining it as a shade of yellow that is neither reddish nor greenish. 15 So we may comfortably sit on the second horn.
Problems with "normal perceivers"?
Although Brogaard clearly thinks her arguments work against the naïve view, her official target in the paper just cited is "objectivism", which comes in (at least) two flavors. The first is "objectivist reflectance physicalism", according to which colors are "disjunctive properties of reflectances that give rise to certain phenomenal effects in normal human perceivers in normal viewing conditions", while the second is "objectivist dispositionalism", according to which "colors are dispositions to give rise to certain 15 The names for the unique hues are quite atypical in this respect. The names for the fine-grained shades one finds in paint catalogs are not defined in terms of other color vocabulary, but instead are (in a sense)
introduced by ostension. This does not help Brogaard, however: a paint name like 'Heritage Red' has its reference fixed by the color of certain physically specified samples, not by their apparent color.
phenomenal effects in normal human perceivers in normal viewing conditions" (2010: 254). 16 If a "normal perceiver" is taken to be someone who passes standard tests for normal color vision, then perceptual variation shows that nothing looks unique green to normal human perceivers in normal viewing conditions. (Here it really doesn't matter what "normal viewing conditions" are supposed to be.) One natural way of specifying the relevant "phenomenal effects" in Brogaard's characterization of the two kinds of objectivism is in terms of 'looks', for instance 'looks yellow' or 'looks unique green'.
Given this understanding of "phenomenal effects", both forms of objectivism are straightforwardly threatened by perceptual variation, because they have the bizarre consequence that although some objects are yellowish-green and some are bluish-green, nothing is unique green. 17 According to "objective reflectance physicalism", for example, something is unique green iff it has the disjunction of reflectances R ug such that an object's having R ug will cause it to look unique green to "normal human perceivers in normal viewing conditions". Since there is no such disjunction, nothing is unique green.
There is nothing here to immediately alarm the proponent of the naïve view, but trouble is brewing if Brogaard has shown that color physicalism, in particular, is false.
There is some pressure to identify the colors with physical properties-for one thing, our color vision system seems well-designed for detecting how objects alter light, so the 16 Brogaard's "disjunctive properties of reflectances" are better characterized as disjunctive types of reflectances.
17 For a defense of this consequence on quite different grounds, see Gert 2006; Gert also denies that unique green is a color, because it is not "the possible color of any object" (2012: 325). To bring out the bizarreness of admitting that things are bluish-green and yellowish-green while denying that anything is unique green, imagine adding a drop of blue paint to a pot of yellowish-green paint, stirring, and repeating.
Every additional drop changes the color of the paint in the pot (to be on the safe side, we can suppose that each drop makes a slight visible difference). The paint in the pot becomes progressively less yellowish and eventually turns bluish-green, so a highly plausible hypothesis is that there is a stage in the sequence where the paint is neither bluish nor yellowish-that is, unique green. (Or if not exactly unique green, then a shade that is very close to unique green; this will do, since the view we are objecting to also implies that nothing is very close to unique green.) default assumption should be that colors are certain modes of optical interaction. 18 The naïve view can happily take physicalism on board, but if physicalism is false then the spectre of eliminativism looms on the horizon. And given a choice between eliminativism and P2, the latter might well seem more attractive.
However, although Brogaard has a completely convincing objection against "objective reflectance physicalism", as she defines it, color physicalism itself is unscathed. For there is no reason why the statement of color physicalism should mention "normal" perceivers, and (as Brogaard brings out) every reason why it shouldn't.
"Reflectance physicalism" (Hilbert 1987, Byrne and Hilbert 2003a) , for example, is simply the view that the colors are kinds of spectral reflectances. Very plausibly, no constitutive connection holds between a traditional "primary quality" like length and normal perceivers; since reflectance physicalism-at least as it is developed in the literature just cited-treats colors as primary qualities, there is no evident need for a constitutive connection here either. 19
Argument by elimination?
Cohen sums up his case for P2-that Brit is veridically perceiving the chip iff Mitt is-as follows:
...the conclusion that there is no uniquely veridical variant was reached by appeal to the phenomenon of variation together with an inductive case against the viability of claiming the unique veridicality of any particular variant. What we observed was that, in instance after instance of variation with respect to color, the most promising attempts to single out a uniquely veridical variant required stipulations that are ultimately unacceptable. (Cohen 2009) 20 What are these "most promising attempts"? In fact, they are all variations on the theme of "normal perceivers": whether Brit or Mitt is correct will depend on which one is "normal". But what is it to be "normal"? We saw in the previous section that normality cannot amount to passing standard tests for normal color vision. Cohen considers two other possibilities: that normality is "set by numerical majority" (31) , and that it is set by the CIE 1931 Standard Observer (31-2). Unsurprisingly, he easily dispatches these suggestions. Since the naïve view does not appear on Cohen's list of promising attempts, his argument by elimination fails to cover the simplest alternative to his own position.
Failure to explain how one variant could be correct?
The naïve view claims that at most one of Brit and Mitt sees the chip in its true colors, and so P2 is false. If one starts with the naïve view, then, there seems little on offer from relationalists and relativists that might give one pause. And, as we will now discuss, relationalism and relativism have serious problems of their own.
3: Objections
This section presents some objections to relationalism. Similar objections apply to relativism-we will relegate brief discussion of (some of) these to footnotes. But first, relationalism needs to be spelled out a little further. , to which we can add a long list of (largely unknown) neural factors. The upshot is that Brit drops out as a relatum, to be replaced by an n-tuple of perceiver parameters. That is, the schematic letter 'S' in the relationalist's locution 'red for S in C' should not be replaced by a simple expression denoting a perceiver (e.g.
'Brit') but rather by a complex expression specifying the values of (many) perceiver parameters. As Cohen puts it, "'S' is a schematic letter standing in for a relatively detailed specification of [the perceiver's] visual system, and 'C' is a schematic letter standing in for a relatively detailed specification of the circumstance [the perceiver is] in at the time" (116).
There are mysteries here, however. How can we find out which parameters are included in S and C? Cohen offers some guidance:
Colors should be construed as involving a relation to a parameter just in case, with all other factors fixed, a change in the relevant parameter can produce a difference in the colors things look to have to a given visual system (and there is no well-motivated, theory-independent reason for setting aside changes in that parameter). (43, fn. 24) This clarifies the intention but it can't be quite right. Given a parameter, what is "held fixed" can't include anything that is later in the causal pathway that connects that parameter to the visual response, otherwise Cohen's test will deliver the result that colors do not involve relations to virtually any parameter. For example, if we hold the light reaching the eye from the scene fixed, then no other scene parameters will make a difference to the apparent colors of things.
In any case, the argument from variation inevitably leads to what we will call the colors F -red-for-S-in-C, puce-for-S*-in-C*,…-being individuated in an extremely finegrained way. The fact that parameters can offset each other provides a dramatic illustration. Given that Cohen says that a parameter should be included if it makes a difference to "the colors things look to have" holding the other factors fixed, there will be parameters for both overall illumination and the state of adaptation of the perceiver. A small increase in overall illumination can make a scene appear (transiently) brighter, but adaptation in the cones can counteract this effect with the net result that there is no change in color appearance. Although with just two parameters such a situation is unlikely, with the full set of parameters there will be realistic situations in which this sort of thing occurs. Since the parameters have changed, there should also be a change in "the colors [i.e. colors F ] things look to have", even though in the ordinary sense of that phrase, there isn't.
Suppose a parameter P affects color appearance, with different values of the parameter-P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ,…-resulting in different appearances. Consider a case of interpersonal variation due to a difference in P: in perceiver A's situation the value of P is P i , and in perceiver B's situation it is P j , i≠j. Schematically, the relationalist diagnosis is in two parts. First, that the "color properties represented" (Cohen 2009: 99) by the two perceivers' visual systems-that is, the colors F -are different. A's visual system represents a certain relational property, bearing R to… P i …, and B's represents the relational property bearing R to… P j …, just like the previous property except that the relatum P i is replaced by the relatum P j . Second, the perceived object has both properties.
Since the visual systems of A and B are sensitive to the value of P, they presumably register that value whenever they can. That is, if two perceptual situations differ in (at least) P, different colors F will be seen. 22 We now turn to two groups of objections, the first related to perception and the second to language. Finally, after that, we will examine whether the relationalist can adequately explain the crucial locution 'color c for S in C'.
Perception
The colors F are individuated so finely that they rarely recur. Consider a bowl of fruit containing a mixture of bananas and oranges. Among the parameters in C will be ones specifying the distribution of reflectances in the scene. Swap a banana for an orange (or a banana for a riper banana) and the seen color F of each of the other pieces of fruit will be different since the circumstances have changed. Among the parameters in S will be ones specifying the state of adaptation of the perceiver. Look away from the bowl at a white wall for a few seconds and then back at the bowl. The seen color F of each piece of fruit will be different since the state of the perceiver's visual system will have changed. Any matches made across circumstances or adaptation states can't be color F matches since there are no colors F in common across changes in the parameters of the relation. Objects that look the same in color (in the intuitive sense) will-we may fairly conjecturealmost never share a color F .
This multiplication of colors F is not, in itself, a problem. Perhaps there are very fine-grained shades of the familiar colors that rarely recur. What is problematic for relationalism is the commitment that we see these properties. Cohen acknowledges that many of the parameters that go into the colors F are not "cognitively" accessible:
[T]here is good reason to doubt that, in general, we have cognitive access to all the different parameters that (on the relationalist view presented) need fixing.
But there is equally good reason to doubt that they are visually accessible. Although each of the parameters is such that it can make a visual difference, there are so many parameters and they interact in such complicated ways that there is almost never any way for the visual system to recover (in theory or in practice) the values of most of them. This would seem to imply either that we don't visually represent such parameters or that, if we do, there is no particular reason to think that our visual representation of color F is veridical. Either way the colors F won't be capable of playing the role that relationalism requires.
A related problem is that the colors F are irrelevant to any of the explanatory tasks for which we normally appeal to the color content of vision. One way to see this is to consider a standard psychophysical experiment that involves subjects attempting to match two stimuli. As this is typically conceived, the subject's task is to determine whether two stimuli look the same or not. Alternatively, the subject is supposed to choose the most similar stimulus to some target. Behavior on tasks like this is determined by how things look to the subject (in the intuitive sense), and so not by which colors F are seen. The point is perfectly general: our behavior guided by color vision is sensitive to differences in color appearance (in the intuitive sense) and not to the very fine-grained differences in the colors F that our visual systems purportedly represent.
Another problem is that the colors F are ecologically insignificant. They are neither significant in their own right nor correlated (even locally) with interesting properties of objects. Colors can be useful in virtue of their local correlation with other properties of interest. You can learn that the tomatoes with the well-developed stripes and the slightly yellowish-green color are the tasty ones. But if you were to attend to the colors F of tomatoes you would not be able to capture this generalization. Unless you bring with you a standard background and a calibrated light source for viewing the individual tomatoes, carefully control your state of adaptation, make sure that each tomato occupies the same visual angle, etc., the seen color F of tomatoes will be different on different occasions, in spite of the similar appearance. The relationalist may well be able to explain our behavior in these cases but it will involve adopting a much coarser categorization than the colors F .
It is thus obscure why we would have a visual system that represents the colors F . Why go to the bother capturing this very fine-grained content if it doesn't enable visually guided behavior?
The colors F , then, are invisible to the visual system, irrelevant to the explanation of behavior, and of no help in reproducing one's kind. What's more, there is a perhaps more fundamental worry. Suppose that, somehow, the visual system could recover the colors F of objects. Short of a miracle, this process could hardly be infallible. Even in perfectly ordinary circumstances involving "normal perceivers" one would expect errors to occur. For example, suppose the value of the illumination parameter in Brit's perceptual circumstance is l. The chip she is looking at is (let us grant) unique green for S in C(…l…), where S is a detailed specification of Brit's visual system, and C(…l…)
is a detailed specification of her perceptual circumstance, including the illuminationparameter value l. We may further suppose that the mechanism that detects the illumination parameter misfires in Brit, resulting in her visual system representing the chip as being unique green for S in C(…l*…), where l≠l*. Finally, we may suppose that the chip is not, in fact, unique green for S in C(…l*…). (If someone were in state S and looked at the chip in circumstances C(…l*…), the chip would not "look unique
green".) Thus there is no guarantee, even if relationalism is accepted, that Brit is
veridically perceiving the chip. The insistence on "faultless disagreement" is pointless, because it is a demand that cannot be met. 23
23 Here is the parallel worry for relativism. In addition to the relativized property unique green (henceforth labeled 'unique green' to distinguish it from the property labeled 'unique green' in English, which is plausibly a familiar non-relativized property) the relativist must countenance other color-like properties, whose relativized application conditions are slightly different from unique green. For the sake of a concrete example, let us work with a suggestion from Egan (2012: 311) and say that an object x is unique green
Language
At least there is some apparent agreement between Brit and Mitt. Surely they will share a belief about the color of the chip, a belief they would each express by saying 'The chip is green'. But are they really agreeing, according to the relationalist? The chip looks greento-S 1 -in-C to Brit, and green-to-S 2 -in-C to Mitt, and it is a racing certainty that S 1 ≠S 2 . So, if Brit (simply) believes that the chip is green-to-S 1 -in-C and expresses this belief by saying 'The chip is green', then (since Mitt will believe and assert a different proposition), there is no agreement after all. Cohen emphasizes that this is unacceptable, saying that "the fine-grained properties are too fine-grained-too determinate-to be represented in our thought and talk" (114). Since the familiar colors-red, green, puce,…-are "represented in our thought and talk", the colors are not the colors F .
Surprisingly, the relationalist has not yet given us a theory of color. 24 relative to S and C iff x is disposed to look unique green to perceivers in S and C, where 'looks unique green' is understood as a phrase of ordinary English. (See also section 3.3 and note 31.) Then we may specify another relativized property, unique green*, as follows: x is unique green* relative to S and C iff x is disposed to look unique green to perceivers in S and C, except where the value of the illumination parameter in C (as specified on the left hand side) is l, in which case x is unique green relative to S and C(…l…) iff x is disposed to look unique green to a perceiver in S and C(…l*…). Granted the existence of relativized properties, how would an object look if it looked unique green? The answer is unobvious, but clearly the relativist supposes it would "look unique green" in the ordinary sense of that phrase. How would an object look if it looked unique green*? Given the relativist's answer to the first question, the natural answer to the second question is the same: it would also look unique green, in the ordinary sense. Suppose the chip facing Brit is unique green relative to S and C(…l…), and not unique green* relative to S and C(…l*…). Now in order to represent an object as being unique green, the visual system somehow has to encode the appropriate kind of extreme sensitivity to the illumination parameter in C. Miracles aside, we may further suppose that something misfires in Brit, resulting in her representing the chip (which looks unique green to her) as unique green*, not unique green. Assuming that Brit's actual state and circumstances are the relevant ones for the purposes of evaluating her perception (see note 11), she counts as misperceiving the chip. 24 The parallel difficulty for relativism is that a typical assertive utterance of 'The chip is green' appears to express an ordinary proposition that is true or false simpliciter, not a relativized proposition that is true only relative to S and C. Brit and Mitt plainly agree that the chip is green and disagree whether the chip is unique green, in the flat-footed non-relativist sense. The semantic data here are not puzzling in the way that What are the colors, then? According to Cohen:
[O]ur ordinary thought and talk about color attributes relatively coarse-grained relational properties to objects, and does so in a way that is context-sensitive. propose that the our ordinary mental (general cognitive) representation of colors works in a similar way, so that it ends up attributing the very same, typically coarser-grained properties to objects. Thus, when I perceive a ripe lemon, and thereby come to hold a belief in context K about its color-a belief to which I would normally give verbal expression (were I so inclined) by an utterance of The chip looks to be a certain determinate color to Brit, namely unique green, and it is that way. Thus she is right, perceptually and linguistically.
And:
The chip looks to be a certain determinate color to Mitt, namely yellowish green, and it is that way. Thus he is right, perceptually and linguistically.
But this is incorrect. Rather, in an ordinary context the correct description of Brit's situation, according to the relationalist, is this:
The chip looks to be a certain determinate color to Brit, namely unique green, but it is not that way. Thus she is wrong, perceptually and linguistically.
And similarly, mutatis mutandis, for Mitt. If you favor the first descriptions over the second then you need some other theory, not relationalism. 27 We can go further. Although Cohen's terminology of "coarse and fine grained colors" (114) might suggest that colors C and colors F belong to the same family, perhaps related as determinables to their determinates, they are quite different sorts of properties. 28 The colors C involve relations to perceiver types and perceptual circumstances of the sort that could be "relevant" to the participants in a conversation, while the second involve relations to the exotica of vision science. On the most natural way of spelling out the two sorts of relations, they don't even have the same adicity.
Admittedly they are not wholly dissimilar, but if red, puce, scarlet and so on are colors C , it is at least a stretch also to count the colors F as colors. 27 Cohen suggests that in some contexts "mechanisms of accommodation could shrink the [relevant] class of perceivers and perceptual circumstances" (121), but that won't help in the present case. If we imagine the little speech just quoted is given in an ordinary context, then it will be unproblematically true (interpreting 'unique green' as unique green for a normal perceiver in normal perceptual circumstances) and so mechanisms of accommodation will not be triggered. (On accommodation, see Lewis 1979b.) So the only sense, according to relationalism, in which Brit and Mitt are both correct is that their visual systems both "veridically represent" (Cohen 2009: 22) It's also true that the chip looks unique green to Brit and slightly yellowish-green to Mitt, and it can't be both. So, since 'looks' is clearly being used here (as throughout this paper) in a perceptual sense, the relationalist must admit that there is perceptual disagreement between Brit and Mitt about the colors of things. But wasn't that precisely the thing that relationalism was introduced to avoid? The relationalist will presumably reply that this sort of "perceptual disagreement" is not really perceptual disagreement in the relevant sense. Really it's a kind of linguistic disagreement, because the visual system serves up the colors F , not the colors C (unique green, yellowish green, etc.). Even if this can be defended, we can now see that the relationalist's main claim about Brit and Mitt is perhaps a little too subtle. 29
'red for S in C'
Finally, we come to the relationalist's technical expression 'color c for S in C'. We saw in section 1.1 that McGinn explains his similar piece of terminology in terms of the disposition to "look red". Cohen follows suit:
I favor the view according to which red for S in C is the functional role of disposing its bearers to look red to S in C, and green for S in C is the functional 29 The objection in this paragraph applies equally to relativism, since the relativist needs a non-relativist account of color language.
role of disposing its bearers to look green to S in C. Mutatis mutandis for the other colors. (178) That is: to be red for S in C is to be disposed to look red to S in C. 30 , 31 However, if 'look red to S in C' is interpreted as a schematic phrase of ordinary English, this cannot possibly be the right explanation of the technical expression 'red for S in C'. Red for S in C is a color F , a property supposedly represented by our visual systems. Looking red to S in C is (on Cohen's view) something else entirely: it is not a property represented by our visual systems, hence is not a color F , and in any case is defined in terms of colors C (the properties picked out by color vocabulary), which stand in just as much need of explanation as colors F .
So, as Cohen says, "the natural next question is what it means to say that something looks red to S in C" (182). He answers as follows:
x looks red to S in C just in case, by visually attending to x in C, S is appropriately caused (in C) to have an experience of red. (182) locution 'Red for S in C' may turn out to stand for nothing. 33 One possibility is to interpret 'experience of red' as 'experience of a certain phenomenological character' (see the quotation from McGinn on the Lockean assumption in section 1.1), where the relevant "phenomenological character" is supposed to be specifiable independently of the color red. But that faces familiar problems (see, e.g., Byrne and Hilbert 2011) .
